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1 Introduction
This paper introduces credit constraints into a two sector Schumpeterian growth model and examines the inter-
play between R&D specific productivity shocks, bubbles and technological innovation. Conventional wisdom has
it that bubbles typically emerge in an economy during periods of high productivity growth (Gordon 2015, Lansing
2009). The argument essentially being that in such an environment, expectations of higher profits coupled with
low interest rates facilitate their creation. On the other hand, we use a two sector growth framework to demonstrate
that adverse shocks to productivity in the R&D sector, the intermediate good sector in our model, can trigger bub-
bles in the economy. More importantly, we demonstrate that in such an environment bubbles play a constructive
role by alleviating credit constraints and fostering innovation and growth.1
We introduce credit constraints into a two-period overlapping generation version of the Schumpeterian growth
model. Agents are risk neutral and maximize their expected old-age consumption. There are two types of agents:
workers and entrepreneurs. In the beginning of the first period, young workers provide labor service in the final
goods sector. They save wages for old age consumption. At the end of the first period, young entrepreneurs are
given an opportunity to become innovators in the R&D sector, the intermediate good sector in our model. They
finance R&D investment with borrowings from the savers. In addition, entrepreneurs face endogenous credit con-
straints because they cannot credibly pledge more than a fraction of the expected output due to an ex-post moral
hazard problem. Their borrowing limit is capped at a fraction of their expected profits. These credit constraints
are introduced in the spirit of the “financial accelerator” models pioneered by Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), where the presence of informational frictions in the economy results in investment by
entrepreneurs being restricted to a fraction of pledgeable collateral.
Next, we proceed to demonstrate that rational bubbles can emerge in such a financially constrained economy.
Essentially, bubbles represent a pro-rata share in a Ponzi scheme. Savers will wish to purchase bubbles as long
as they offer a return at least equal to the interest rate in the economy. Due to the presence of credit constraints,
any decrease in the value of their expected profits reduces demand for investment. The consequent fall in interest
rates lowers the rate of return that bubbles have to offer so that they are attractive to savers. In this sense, binding
credit constraints make bubbles viable in our framework.
We show that periods of permanently low productivity in the intermediate good R&D sector are conducive for
the emergence of rational bubbles. Essentially, a decline in productivity in this intermediate good sector reduces
the value of collateral, causing credit constraints to bind. The resultant excess supply of credit and lower interest
rates opens the door for creation of bubbles. In such an environment, bubbles help circumvent the moral hazard
problem and facilitate transfer of resources from savers to entrepreneurs. This reallocation then stimulates higher
innovation and growth in the economy.
1See also Farhi and Tirole (2011), Miao and Wang (2011), Martin and Ventura (2012, 2016), Hirano and Yanagawa (2016), and Takao (2017)
on the role of bubbles in alleviating credit constraints.
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The longevity and path of bubbles are critically dependent upon market expectations and investor sentiments.
Savers in our economy will hold bubbles only if they expect the next generation of savers to buy it from them.
The fragility of these bubbles therefore creates a natural role for the government in helping facilitate the transfer
of resources from savers to entrepreneurs in a credit constrained economy. We show that government credits to
the R&D sector, financed through issue of public debts, can be a credible policy instrument in alleviating credit
constraints and facilitating innovation.
This paper is closely related to Martin and Ventura (2016, MV), who examine a one sector economy where firms
face credit constraints. Negative productivity shocks cause investment demand and interest rates to fall thereby
facilitating the emergence of bubbles. Further, bubbles serve as collateral in their framework and can potentially
“crowd in” and “crowd out” investments. Their paper focuses on business cycles and goes on to examine the
optimal size of the bubbles in such an environment. Our framework on the other hand involves a two sector
growth model where the R&D sector which produces intermediate goods faces borrowing constraints. Our focus,
unlike MV is on the impact of bubbles on long term growth and not business cycles. Crucially, we show that
in such a framework bubbles arise only when there are adverse productivity shocks specific to this intermediate
good sector. These shocks cause credit constraints in the sector to bind and reduce the demand for funds while
leaving supply unchanged. The consequent drop in the interest rates facilitates bubbles. Importantly, in contrast
to MV, adverse shocks to productivity in the final good sector do not give rise to bubbles in our model. Such a
shock impacts both demand and supply of funds symmetrically and therefore leaves interest rates unchanged.
MV would be a special case of our setup where there is only one sector and no growth. Our policy prescription for
an economy with rational bubbles is also different from that obtained in MV. They show that in an economy where
bubbles serve as collateral a “lean against the wind credit policy (LAW)” helps stabilize business cycles and hence
is welfare enhancing. We, on the other hand, use our endogenous growth framework to show that a constant credit
rule akin to the Friedman rule stimulates long term growth and thereby trumps the LAW policy. Put differently,
our analysis suggests that while a LAW policy might succeed in mitigating business cycles, it could have adverse
consequences for long term growth.
Our policy analysis here also contributes to the larger debate which has sought to analyze the causes of the
Great Recession and the slow pace of recovery that has followed. Anzoategui et al. (2016) point out that conven-
tional demand side based explanations are unable to account for the extraordinarily sluggish movement of the
economy back to the pre-crisis trend. Consistent with the explanation in our paper, they attribute the recessions
and the sluggish recovery to reduced R&D expenditure2. Our policy prescription of government subsidized R&D
expenditure therefore offers a new insight into the “secular stagnation” debate.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present our basic model without bubbles, section
3 discusses equilibrium properties of our economy with bubbles, section 4 examines the impact of productivity
2Please also see Barlevy (2007), Aghion et al. (2005). Consistent with our results these papers document that R&D expenditures in the US are
pro-cyclical.
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shocks on bubbles and innovation. In section 5, we examine the role of government policy, section 6 carries out
stochastic simulations and section 7 concludes the paper.
2 The Baseline Model - No bubbles
This section extends the simple Schumpeterian two-sector growth model of Aghion and Howitt (2009) to include
financial frictions. We begin by analyzing the model without bubbles. People consume one good, called the final
good, which is produced by perfectly competitive firms using labor and a continuum of intermediate goods. There
are overlapping generations of agents who live for two periods. Each generation consists of two types - workers
and innovators. The mass of workers and innovators born in each period is one and ε, respectively. They maximize
the old age consumption. Young workers are employed in the final good sector and earn wages at the beginning of
the period. They save wages for old age consumption.
Output growth results from technological innovations that enhance the productivity of intermediate products.
Each young innovator-entrepreneur is given an opportunity to improve one type of intermediate goods at the end
of the period. Successful innovation creates a new version of the intermediate product to be used in the next
period, which is more productive than the previous versions. Importantly, we assume that entrepreneurs finance
their R&D investment expenditure through risky borrowings from the market. Figure 1 summarizes the sequence
of events.
[Figure 1 about here.]
2.1 Final Good Sector
The economy has one multi-purpose final good. It can be consumed, used as an input to R&D and used for the
production of intermediate goods. The final good is produced by the technology
Zt =H 1−αt
∫ ε
0
At (i )
1−α xt (i )αdi (1)
where α ∈ (0,1), Ht denotes labor input, xt (i ) is input of the latest generation of intermediate goods at t , and
At (i ) is productivity associated with it. The final goods market is perfectly competitive. Taking the final good as
numeraire, the price of intermediate good equates its marginal product.
pt (i )=α
[
At (i )
xt (i )
]1−α
(2)
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2.2 Intermediate Sectors
For each intermediate sector i , one innovator is born in each period. At the end of t , εmass of the young innovators
engage in R&D to create a new version of the intermediate goods to be used in the next period. If the R&D activity is
successful, the innovator is given the monopoly power in the sector at t+1. If not, the monopoly passes to another
old person at random. Let µt (i ) denote the probability of successful R&D for such an innovator working in the
intermediate sector i . The productivity of intermediate good i is then, for γ> 1,
At+1(i )=

γAt with probability of µt (i )
At otherwise
(3)
where At =
∫ ε
0 At (i )di is the average technology level at t . Given the homogeneity and the law of large numbers,
the fraction of successful innovators is µt =µt (i ). The average technology evolves according to
At+1 =µtγAt +
(
1−µt
)
At +ut+1 At (4)
where, u denotes the direct shock to the productivity in the final good sector. The growth rate of the average
productivity is
g t+1 = At+1− At
At
=µt
(
γ−1)+ut+1 (5)
2.3 R&D Sector
The innovation technology for any sector i is given by
µt (i )=
√
λNt (i )
A∗t+1
≤ 1 (6)
where µt (i ) denotes the probability of successful innovation for young innovator i at period t , λ is a R&D produc-
tivity parameter, Nt (i ) is the R&D spending required for µt (i ), and A∗t+1 = γAt is the target productivity level. The
probability of innovation depends inversely on A∗ because as technology advances, it becomes more difficult to
improve upon. Further, the higher is the R&D efficiency, λ, the smaller is the R&D expenses to achieve a given µt .
Rewriting Eq (6), we obtain the R&D spending as function of innovation probability µt (i )
Nt (i )=
A∗t+1
λ
µt (i )
2 (7)
Since innovators have no income, they must borrow R&D expenditure Nt . The prospective entrepreneurs finance
their investment activity by selling credit contracts to the savers. To motivate the credit constraint, following
Aghion et al. (1999), we assume that there exists ex-post moral hazard. In particular, the innovators can incur
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a cost and hide the proceeds from successful R&D activities. The hiding cost has to be paid when the borrow-
ing is made. It is proportional to the expected profits and given by qµt (i )piA∗t+1. The parameter q ∈ (0,1) reflects
factors such as the lender’s effectiveness in monitoring, legal costs of bankruptcy, policy makers’ stance on protec-
tion of financial contracts, and other institutional elements. Borrowers would choose to be honest if the incentive
compatibility condition below holds:
µt (i )Rt+1(i )Nt (i )≤Rt+1qµt (i )piA∗t+1
where Rt+1(i ) is the gross risky interest rate on a loan to entrepreneur i between t and t + 1 and Rt+1 denotes
the risk-free interest factor. The left hand side of the equation above represents the expected benefits from being
dishonest while the right hand side is the expected costs. Since the hiding cost has to be paid regardless of the
success of R&D, the relevant interest rate is the risk-free interest factor, Rt+1.
Savers from the young generation are the only lenders in this overlapping generations economy. Everyone
has access to the storage technology. Thus, the expected return on lending must satisfy the following incentive
compatibility
1≤µt (i )Rt+1(i )=Rt+1.
The last equality follows from the risk neutrality of lenders and competitive loan markets. Combining the in-
centive compatibility conditions of borrowers and lenders, we obtain the maximum amount which innovator-
entrepreneurs can invest as follows:
Nt (i )≤ qµt (i )piA∗t+1 (8)
One could interpret the parameter q in the above equation as the loan-to-value ratio (LTV). The entrepreneurs
choose innovation probability µt (i ) to maximize their expected profit
max
µt (i )
pit+1(i )=µt (i )piA∗t+1−Rt+1Nt (i ) (9)
subject to the technology constraint (7) and the financial constraint (8).
2.3.1 Non-binding financial constraint
We begin by considering the case where the financial constraint (8) is not binding. Solving (9) for this case yields
the unconstrained innovation probability, which is given by
µ∗t =
piλ
2Rt+1
(10)
Combining (7) and (10), the unconstrained optimum R&D expense is
5
N∗t (i )=
pi2λγ
4R2t+1
At (11)
It follows from (11) that R&D expenditure in the unconstrained economy varies directly with R&D productivity λ
and inversely with the interest rate Rt+1.
The sole input to the intermediate sector is the final good. Using a linear technology, the monopoly pro-
ducer can convert one unit of general good into one unit of the latest available version of intermediate good.
Given the inverse demand (2), the monopolist i at period t chooses the quantity xt (i ) to maximize profit, Πt (i )=
αAt (i )1−α xt (i )α−xt (i ). This implies the equilibrium quantity is
xt (i )=α
1
1−α At (i ) (12)
Then, the equilibrium profit of the monopoly is
pit (i )=piAt (i ) (13)
where pi= (1−α)α 1+α1−α . Combining (1) and (12), we find that gross output of the general good is given as
Zt =ϕAt
where ϕ=α α1−α . The GDP in our economy grows at the same rate as the technology growth rate g t .
2.3.2 Binding constraint
Under binding financial constraints, the R&D expenditure Nˆt+1 is determined by (8) as follows:
Nˆt =µt (i )qpiA∗t+1 (14)
2.4 Market Equilibrium
We are now ready to solve the model. Young workers supply a unit of labor inelastically and thus Ht = 1. In the
competitive market for labor, old monopolists demand labor until the wage equals its marginal product, thus,
wt =ωAt (15)
where ω= (1−α)ϕ.
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Combining (7), (8) and A∗t+1 = γAt , the constrained innovation probability becomes
µˆt = µˆ= qλpi (16)
Combining (14) and (16) constrained investment can be expressed as
Nˆt+1 = νAt .
where ν= µˆqpiγ= q2pi2λγ. We summarize our results in the lemma below.
Lemma 1 The constrained investment increases with R&D efficiency λ, monopoly profits pi and the loan-to-value
ratio, q.
Essentially, higher values of λ, pi and q raise the pledgeable “collateral”. This in turn relaxes the restraint on bor-
rowing and drives up constrained investment.
Savers are willing to supply credit to the entrepreneur as long as the return is greater than the opportunity cost.
Each saver can supply their wages earned as credit as long as their incentive compatibility is satisfied. Therefore,
the supply of credit available at the end of t is described as follows:
St =

ωAt if Rt+1 ≥ 1
0 otherwise
(17)
The demand for credit follows from (11) and (14). Formally,
D t = εNt
= ε
[
min
(
pi2λγ
4R2t+1
,ν
)]
At (18)
It follows from (18), that due to the borrowing constraint faced by the entrepreneurs, the credit demand curve is
kinked at
Rt+1 = R¯ =
√
pi2λγ
4ν
= 1
q
.
To streamline the discussion, we focus on the case with R¯ ≥ 1 or q ≤ 1/2. If not, the lender’s incentive compatibility
is never satisfied when the borrowing is constrained and trivially there will be no lending in equilibrium.
The dynamics of the credit market can be analyzed with (17) and (18). By construction, the unconstrained
credit market equilibrium occurs where the demand and supply curves intersect along the downward sloping sec-
tion of D t as in Figure 2a.
[Figure 2 about here.]
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Hence, the unconstrained equilibrium interest rate is
R∗ =
√
pi2λγε
4ω
(19)
The constrained financial market emerges when the borrowing is restricted to the size of collateral. This is depicted
in Figure 2b.
Since St −D t > 0, savers compete for existing lending opportunities. This drives the interest rate down to the
opportunity cost. It follows that in the constrained economy the interest rate Rˆ is pinned down by the lender’s
incentive compatibility condition and given by
Rˆ = 1 (20)
The credit market equilibrium can be summarized by the following excess credit supply curve:
St −D t
At
=

0 if Rt+1 =R∗
ω−εν if Rt+1 = 1
(21)
The key findings in this section can be summarized in the Lemma below.
Lemma 2 The constrained equilibrium arises if and only if
ξ=ω−εν> 0.
Combined with Lemma 1, this result indicates that the constrained equilibrium is more likely to arise, when the
loan-to-value ratio (q) is low or when the value of ‘collateral’ is small due to low R&D productivity (λ) or low
monopoly profits (pi).
Next, we compare growth rates in the constrained and unconstrained economies. Combining (5), (10) and (19),
the unconstrained innovation probability and the corresponding growth rate are
µ∗ =
√
ωλ
εγ
, g∗ =
√
ωλ
εγ
(
γ−1)+u
Analogously, using (6) and (14), the innovation probability and the growth rate in a constrained economy are given
by
µˆ=
√
νλ
γ
, gˆ =
√
νλ
γ
(γ−1)+u (22)
Given the condition in Lemma 1, it can be seen that g∗ > gˆ . Since the output growth rate in the economy is a
function of investment in the R&D sector, it is not surprising that the growth rate in a constrained economy is
lower than the unconstrained case.
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3 Bubbles
This section introduces rational bubbles to the model. Essentially, bubbles represent a pro-rata share in a Ponzi
scheme. In the market for bubbles, some of the bubbles are old since they have been initiated by previous gener-
ations of entrepreneurs and sustained by a chain of savers. Some are newly initiated by the current generation of
young entrepreneurs. We use Bt to denote the total size of the old bubbles carried over from t −1 to t and B Nt to
denote the new bubbles issued at time t , respectively. Bubbles start randomly and are purchased by young savers
in the expectation that the future generation will pay more to buy them.
Formally, rational bubbles are represented by a (stochastic) process {Bt ,B Nt }
∞
t=0 which satisfies the following
conditions.
Et
[
RBt+1
]= Et
[
Bt+1
Bt +B Nt
]
=Rt+1 (23)
Bt +B Nt ≤ wt (24)
Bt , B
N
t ≥ 0 (25)
lim
T→∞
[
T∏
s=0
Bt+s+1
Bt+s +B Nt+s
]1/T
≤ lim
T→∞
[
T∏
s=0
(
1+ g t+s
)]1/T
(26)
The first condition (23) indicates the no-arbitrage condition. It requires that bubbles must deliver the same return
as the alternative investment opportunity in equilibrium to attract investors. The next line (24) implies that the
size of bubbles cannot exceed the resources available for bubble purchase. Equation (25) reflects the assumption
that bubbles can be freely disposed and hence must be non-negative. Finally, (26) implies that the growth rate of
bubbles cannot exceed the GDP growth rate in the long run. If this were not to be the case, then the aggregate
bubble would eventually be too large for the next generation to purchase and therefore would not be sustainable.
3.1 Bubbles in the Capital Market
Traditionally, the literature on bubbles has focused on dynamically inefficient economies. The reasoning follows
easily from our discussion in the previous section. As (23) makes it clear, savers wish to purchase bubbles if these
grow at least as fast as the interest rate. Equation (26) implies that as long as the growth rate of bubbles does
not exceed the output growth rate, savers will be able to mobilize enough resources to procure the bubble. Put
together, it follows that bubbles are possible in equilibrium only if the interest rate does not exceed the output
growth rate. Such a situation arises naturally when the frictionless economy is dynamically inefficient. Low interest
rates in these economies arise due to excessive savings which in turn result in inefficiently high investment and
low consumption.
9
The seminal work by Tirole (1985) among others has established that bubbles can be welfare enhancing in such
a scenario by reducing inefficient investment and increasing consumption. However, Martin and Ventura (2012)
point out that the conclusions of this literature are at odds with the data as bubbles are typically characterized by
rising and not falling investment. They instead show that the interest rate in an otherwise dynamically efficient
economy can fall below the growth rate when the agents are shut out of credit markets. Here, the interest rate is
low because the demand for funds is low and, if anything, there might be underinvestment.
This is the focus of our paper also. Importantly, we examine how productivity shocks to the innovation sector
alter borrowing constraints leading to the emergence or collapse of bubbles in dynamically efficient economies.
To ensure dynamic efficiency in the unconstrained steady state, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 1 (Dynamic efficiency) R∗ ≥ 1+ g∗
This inequality ensures that the frictionless economy is dynamically efficient and investment is always productive.
The left-hand side of the inequality represents the average return earned by the savers, which is also equal to
the ex-ante marginal productivity of the investment in the unconstrained regime. In the absence of borrowing
limits, no excess credit supply exists and the returns on financial instruments such as savings and bubbles directly
reflect the productivity of real investment. Due to the availability of excess credit, in the constrained case, the
marginal product of investment is larger than the average return earned by savers. But the endogenous borrowing
constraints arising from the moral hazard issue prevents the savers from offering further loans. Private sector
bubbles can play a constructive role in this environment by transferring resources from savers to credit constrained
entrepreneurs. As in other standard rational bubble models, savers purchase bubbles in the expectation that the
future generation will buy it.
Formally, the maximum R&D investment that entrepreneurs can make in period t in the presence of bubbles
is given by
Nt (i )≤ qµt (i )piA∗t+1+bNt (i ) (27)
where bNt (i ) is the bubble initiated by entrepreneur i in time t .
3 This means that the borrowing in the presence of
bubbles is Nt (i )−bNt (i ). Thus, the capital demand curve in the economy with bubbles can be rewritten as
DBt = εNt −B Nt
= ε
[
min
(
pi2λγ
4R2t+1
,ν
)
−ω
]
At −B Nt (28)
where B Nt =
∫ ²
i=0b
N
t (i )di denotes the total amount of new bubbles made in period t . It can be seen from (28),
3More generally, one can analyze an economy in which both innovators and savers can initiate new bubbles and/or the new bubbles are
large enough that R&D can be self-financed. The introduction of such productive bubbles will not alter the key predictions of our model.
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the introduction of new bubbles B Nt , reduces the borrowing required for investment, causing a downward parallel
shift in the credit demand curve DBt at all ranges of the interest rate.
Savers allocate their wage income into lending and purchasing bubbles. The credit supply curve in the econ-
omy with bubbles is given by
SBt =

ωAt − (Bt +B Nt ) if Rt+1 ≥ 1
0 Otherwise
(29)
Since a part of the resources of the savers is diverted to purchase bubbles (both old and new), the non-zero part of
the credit supply curve (29) shifts by the total size of the bubbles, Bt +B Nt .
3.2 Equilibrium in an economy with bubbles
This section characterizes the equilibrium in an economy with bubbles and analyzes related dynamics. Combining
(19), (28) and (29), we obtain an expression for the excess supply of credit:
SBt −DBt
At
=

0 if Rt+1 = Et RBt+1
ω−εν−Bt if Rt+1 = 1
(30)
Here, the interest factor becomes a function of the existing bubbles and given by
Rt+1 = Et RBt+1 =
εpi2λγ
4(ω−Bt /At )
≥R∗. (31)
The last inequality follows from the non-negativity of bubbles and ∂Et RBt+1/∂Bt > 0.
Notice that the excess credit supply and interest rate are functions of Bt but not of B Nt . This happens because
the introduction of new bubbles B Nt , reduces the demand and supply of credit by exactly the same amount, leaving
the excess credit supply equation in the economy unaltered. The old bubble Bt , on the other hand impacts only
the supply curve, thereby reducing the availability of credit in the economy.
To study the equilibrium dynamics of bubbles, it is useful to redefine our bubble variable in order to make the
model recursive. Let zt = Bt /At and zNt = B Nt /At be the stock of old and new bubbles normalized by the level of
aggregate productivity in the economy. Then, we can rewrite (23) and (24) as4
4When zt −ξ= 0, any return within the [1,R∗] range is consistent with the credit market equilibrium. Without loss of generality, we assign
this non-generic borderline case to the constrained economy.
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Et [zt+1]=

Et RBt+1
1+g t+1
(
zt + zNt
)
if ξ− zt < 0
1
1+g t+1
(
zt + zNt
)
if ξ− zt ≥ 0
(32)
lim
T→∞
Et
[
T∏
s=0
zt+s+1
zt+s + zNt+s
]1/T
≤ lim
T→∞
[
T∏
s=0
(1+ g t+s )
]
(33)
zt + zNt ∈ [0,ω]. (34)
Now, we are ready to analyze the dynamics of bubbles in our economy. We begin by establishing that bubbles
cannot arise in an unconstrained economy.
Lemma 3 Bubbles in the economy are possible if and only if the economy is credit constrained (ξ≥ 0)
We provide an intuitive graphical proof for the above lemma. Figure 3 uses (32) to plot Et zt+1 against zt assum-
ing zNt+s = 0 for all s ≥ 0. The top panel illustrates the case when the economy is financially unconstrained, implying
there exists no excess credit supply, ξ < 0. Note, in Figure 3a, that the dynamic efficiency condition (Assumption
1) and (31) ensure that the slope d zt+1/d zt = Et R
B
t+1
1+g t+1 > 1. This implies that the expected return from holding the
bubble in equilibrium exceeds the growth rate in the economy. It immediately follows that this is violation of (33),
which implies the size of the bubble zt will eventually overtake the availability of resources making it non-viable.
Hence, zt = zNt = 0 for all t is the only feasible equilibrium for the unconstrained case.
On the other hand, the bottom panel shows the bubble dynamics for the constrained economy in which ξ> 0.
Due to the availability of positive excess credit, the interest rate is low and the slope is d zt+1/d zt = 11+g t+1 < 1 for
zt ≤ ξ in Figure 3b. This implies the growth rate of the economy exceeds the return on investment. Thus (33) is
satisfied. The economy stays in this constrained regime as long as zt ≤ ξ = ω−εν < ω. This satisfies the resource
constraint (34). Therefore, the process of such bubbles is indeed sustainable.
To summarize, Lemma 3 shows that the existence of rational bubbles in the presence of dynamic efficiency is
possible when financial constraints are binding, in which the return on savings are uncoupled from the marginal
productivity of borrowers. The excess supply of funds together with low required returns on savings support envi-
ronments for rational bubbles.
[Figure 3 about here.]
We complete the characterization of bubbles by establishing the upper bound of the bubble size.
Corollary 4 In the credit constrained economy in which ξ ≥ 0: (i) The old bubble zt cannot exceed max{0,ξ}. (ii)
Total size of bubbles zt + zNt is bounded by max{0,min{ξ(1+ g Bt+1),ω}} where g Bt+1 is the growth rate of the economy
after introduction of a new bubble of size zNt
12
Proof. The proof follows from examining Figure 3b. In the range zt+1 > ξ, there is no excess credit and bubbles
compete with real investments for the savings in the unconstrained economy. The dynamic efficiency condition
and (31) imply that the required return in this range exceeds the GDP growth rate. This is reflected in the jump
in the slope of the graph. The high rates of return in turn make bubbles non-viable in this region following the
arguments in Lemma 3. The maximum size of the bubble in this region is therefore zero. In contrast, the range
zt+1 ≤ ξ, is characterized by excess credit. The slope of graph is below the 45 degree line because the required
return on the bubbles is lower than the economic growth rate. The low rates of return in turn make bubbles viable
in this region. Since this argument holds for each time period t , (i) follows. To establish the maximum size of the
total bubbles (zt + zNt ), first observe that (32) implies Et zt+1 = (zt + zNt )/(1+ g t+1). Further, (i) implies Et zt+1 ≤ ξ
for bubbles to be sustainable. Put together, it follows that the size of the total bubble must be bounded by zt+zNt ≤
ξ(1+ g t+1) for some g t+1. Finally, zt + zNt ≤ω due to the resource constraint (34).
This corollary establishes the upper bound on bubbles which an economy can support. The maximum size of
bubbles is determined by the amount of excess credit supply, ξ, which would prevail in the constrained equilibrium
without bubbles. The low interest rates in a credit constrained economy make bubbles viable. When the economy
is unconstrained, the rate of return in the economy is too high for bubbles to be sustainable in the presence of
dynamic efficiency assumption.
The next section characterizes economic growth under the bubble and derive the upper bound of g t+1 in such
settings.
3.3 Bubbles and Economic Growth
In the previous section, we have shown that the bubbles can exist only in a credit constrained economy. This
section examines the link between bubbles and economic growth in such an economy.
Corollary 5 For a given new bubble zNt = δεν where δ> 0, the maximum growth rate is g B = gˆ (1+δ)0.5
Proof. Note, under decreasing returns to scale technology in the R&D sector, an equal distribution among
entrepreneurs is the most efficient use of new bubbles. An equal distribution of B Nt = δενAt among ε innovators
yields the R&D spending per entrepreneur of ν (1+δ) At . Substituting this in equation (6), the result follows. Since
δ> 0, it follows that the growth rate of the economy under bubbles, g B is strictly larger than the constrained growth
rate gˆ .5
The above discussion implies that new bubbles by reallocating savings to entrepreneurs in a credit constrained
economy are expansionary in nature. Having examined the effects of new bubbles on economic growth, we pro-
ceed to establish the maximum size of new bubbles in steady state.
5Implicitly, we assume that value of δ is not too large so that the addition of new bubbles does not violate the upper bound in Corollary 4 or
is sufficient funding N∗, the optimal level of R&D.
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Corollary 6 The maximum size of steady state new bubble is zN
∗ = ξg B∗ , where g B∗ , the maximum steady state
growth rate in the economy with bubbles is defined in Appendix.
Proof. See Appendix.
Corollary 6 establishes that bubbles are not only feasible in constrained steady state but also, by facilitating
growth, create room for further bubbles in the future. Intuitively, new bubbles “crowd in” investment by transfer-
ring idle resources from the savers to entrepreneurs in the credit constrained economy. The consequent increase
in growth results in excess credit, paving the way for the emergence of new bubbles in the constrained economy.
To see this graphically, consider the economy initially located at X in Figure 4. The creation of a new bubble,
∆z increases productivity and economic growth causes the zt+1 line to rotate downwards, moving the economy to
point W . Notice, here, there are two effects in play. First, the rise in economic growth means that the size of the
existing bubble shrinks relative to the size of the economy, in other words, the size of the normalized bubble, z, is
lower at point W relative to Y . Second, the rise in wages due to increased productivity means there is an increase
in the supply of savings. This excess credit supply in turn opens the door to creation of further bubbles in the
economy provided the total size of bubbles is smaller than the upper limit in Corollary 4.
It however bears emphasis that in addition to “crowding in” productive investment, new bubbles can poten-
tially also “crowd out” investment. This is easily seen by noticing that the creation of new bubbles increases the
total size of bubbles in the economy. Consequently, future generations have to devote increasing amount of their
resources in procuring existing bubbles. This has the effect of crowding out productive investment. On balance,
as long as the economy is credit constrained and the size of the bubble does not exceed the maximum permissible
limit, bubbles facilitate innovation and growth in our framework.
[Figure 4 about here.]
4 Bubbles, R&D Productivity and Financial Constraints
This section discusses the link between bubbles and permanent shocks to the R&D sector and the final goods sec-
tor in our model. The literature has largely focussed on productivity shocks u to the final good sector, in explaining
bubbles in the economy (See Martin and Ventura 2012, 2016 for example). Instead, our model has two sectors and
we assume that the R&D sector is subject to a financial constraint due to intangibility of output and associated
moral hazard issues whereas the final good sector is not. In this setting, bubbles may arise when the financially
constrained R&D sector is subject to adverse productivity shocks. Importantly, adverse shocks to productivity in
the unconstrained final good sector u, do not result in bubbles in our framework. The key results in this section
are summarized in the corollary below:
Corollary 7
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1. Adverse shocks to λ or the productivity in the intermediate good producing R&D sector may result in rational
bubbles.
2. Adverse shocks to u, the final good productivity does not result in rational bubbles.
To see this, consider an economy initially in the unconstrained steady state which faces an unanticipated perma-
nent negative shock to R&D productivity, λ. The consequent reduction in the value of collateral causes investment
demand to fall. When the shock is large, the borrowing constraint becomes binding, which in turn opens the door
to rational bubbles by Lemma 3. It therefore follows that a sufficiently large increase inλ, by increasing the demand
for investment and reducing excess credit can eliminate existing bubbles. Conversely, it follows from Lemmas 1–3
that the conditions for bubbles are not affected when there are productivity shocks specific to the final good sector.
A decline in u induces a parallel shift in both supply and demand for funds leaving the (normalized) excess supply
of funds and hence interest rates unchanged. In other words, unlike the shock to λ, it does not have asymmetric
effects on borrowers and lenders in our two sector model. Our results here therefore differ from MV where where
productivity shocks to the final good sector trigger bubbles in the economy.
Interestingly, a mean-reverting shock inλdoes not shift the economy from a fundamental into a bubble regime.
Consider an economy that is initially in unconstrained steady state. Now suppose that a large unexpected negative
temporary shock in λ hits the economy so that the innovators are financially constrained temporarily. Everyone
in the economy knows that this shock will diminish eventually at some point t + s and revert to the initial uncon-
strained steady state. Given (26) and Assumption 1, the bubbles will have no value at t+ s. By backward induction,
no one will demand the bubble at period t .
5 Government Intervention
We have shown in that a negative permanent shock to the productivity in the R&D sector can result in credit con-
straints binding, causing a fall in the innovation probability and aggregate growth rate. In such a milieu, bubbles
generated in the private sector help “crowd in” investments and raise the growth rate of the economy above the
constrained growth rate.
However, since bubbles originating in the private sector are largely driven by investor sentiment, there are the
obvious fragility concerns associated with them. Is there therefore anything governments can do to help alleviate
credit constraints and facilitate R&D investment? In this section, we propose government fiscal policy in the form
of R&D credit financed by perpetually rolled-over public debts as a way of mitigating investment credit constraints
in dynamically efficient economies. Below, we establish that such a regime alleviates credit constraints much like
a private sector bubble without running the risk of bubble crashes.
We now proceed describe an economy without private bubbles but one where there is government fiscal policy
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in the form of credit contracts to the R&D sector financed by perpetually rolled-over public debts. At the end of t ,
the government issues new one-period discount bonds dt+1/Rdt+1 = dt +d Nt . These funds are then used to redeem
old bonds, dt , held by the old savers as well as distribute research credits d Nt among young entrepreneurs. R
d
t is
the gross return promised on the debt. Formally, the path of government debt satisfies the following conditions:
Rdt+1 =Rt+1 =

R∗ > 1 if unconstrained
1 otherwise
(35)
dt +d Nt ≤ wt (36)
lim
T→∞
[
T∏
s=0
dt+s+1
dt+s +d Nt+s
]1/T
≤ lim
T→∞
[
T∏
s=0
(
1+ g t+s
)]1/T
(37)
where (35)–(37) are analogous to (23)–(26).
One concern that may arise with the above proposal is that public debt in this scenario is a bubble in itself
and hence raises the same fragility concerns surrounding a bubble. If the next generation refuses to roll-over the
debt, the bubble crashes. Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2006) emphasize that, unlike the bubble itself, the debt
roll-over is not subject to stochastic breakdown. The key is that the government can pledge to fill any shortfalls
in the debt rollover with income taxes. This off-equilibrium commitment is sufficient to ensure that the debt is
always repaid, even though no taxes are ever actually collected in equilibrium.
In the next section, we carry out a simulation exercise where we proceed to show that such a tax payer funded
initiative implemented by a credible government does a better job of facilitating growth in a credit constrained
economy than private sector bubbles. Intuitively, the fragility of bubbles in the private sector means that the ex-
post return on surviving bubbles must be higher than that obtained under the government funded credit. This
leads to higher investment and growth under the government regime.
6 Numerical Simulation
In this section, we run a series of stochastic simulation exercises where we compare dynamics in the face of tem-
porary shocks to R&D productivity (λ) under the following three scenarios: (a) the baseline economy described in
Section 2, (b) the economy with private sector bubbles described in Section 3, (c) the economy with government
funded credits described in Section 5.
For this exercise, we assume that the steady state of the economy is financially constrained, thus, satisfying the
condition in Lemma 3 so that the existence of bubbles is possible. The R&D specific productivity shock is modelled
as mean reverting 2-state Markov chain. In particular, assume thatλt = λ¯+∆λt > 0 and∆λt ∈ {−σ,σ} whereσ> 0 is
the size of shock. Bubbles emerging in the private sector are subject to a sentiment shock, represented by a dummy
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variable D st . If D
s
t = 1 with the probability of δst , the sentiment is favorable and savers accept bubbles as long as
(32) is met. If D st = 0, with the probability of 1−δst , existing bubbles burst (Bt = 0) and new bubbles are not created.
Due to the no-arbitrage condition (32), the bubbles must pay the expected return on alternative investment, Rt . In
the presence of sentiment shock, this means that the realization of the return on bubbles must satisfy
RBt =

Rt /δst if D
s
t = 1
0 Otherwise
(38)
The difference RBt −Rt = (1−δst )/δst Rt represents the risk premium compensating for exposure to sentiment shock.
The creation of new bubbles is subject to a similar shock. When Dnt = 1, with probability of δnt , entrepreneurs are
able to sell new bubbles conditional on D st = 1. With probability 1−δnt , Dnt = 0 and zNt = 0.
The realization of the shocks is revealed to all agents at the beginning of each period. To simplify, we assume
that transition probabilities for productivity and bubble shocks are independent. For simplicity the normalized
size of new bubbles is fixed at zNt = n. In the simulation where the government debt policy is introduced, we set
d Nt /At = n for all t , to facilitate comparison. The proceeds from selling bubbles and the government debts are
distributed equally among young entrepreneurs. The values of parameters used in the simulation exercise and
short description are reported in Table 1.
[Table 1 about here.]
6.1 Private bubbles vs government debt policy in simulated economy
Figure 5 plots the sample time series paths of key variables under the three regimes over 100 periods. The initial
GDP is normalized to unity. To facilitate comparison across regimes, in this graph, we remove the log-linear time
trend in B ,d , N and A using the sample GDP growth rate for the baseline economy. Thus, the plots represent
deviation from the benchmark economy’s log-linear GDP growth trend and could be interpreted as a counter-
factual outcomes under private sector bubbles and debt policy, respectively.
[Figure 5 about here.]
In the baseline economy (the blue solid line), both R&D investment and the GDP growth rate follow the path
of the R&D productivity, λ. Next, we consider an economy with bubbles (the red broken line). It is clear that both
investment and economic growth are higher in this case relative to the baseline economy since bubbles channel
idle funds into R&D investment. Note, that the realized return on bubbles fluctuate between 0 and R/δs . Periods
in which investors expect the bubble to collapse (low δ), result in high values of RB , since investors expect to
be compensated for the higher risk undertaken. Finally, the green dotted line represents the case where R&D
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investment is subsidized by government credits. Here, as expected, R&D investment and therefore output growth
is higher than other two regimes.
To summarize, the key friction or inefficiency in our framework is the presence of borrowing constraints in the
R&D sector. Private sector bubbles can play a constructive role in this environment by transferring resources to
credit constrained entrepreneurs. However, the fragility of private sector bubbles calls into question their effec-
tiveness. Instead, credible tax funded government policy in the form of credits to the R&D sector does a much
better job at addressing the fundamental inefficiency in the economy. Our results indicate after 100 periods, the
output under the prescribed government policy is about thrice higher than the baseline case.
6.2 Credit policy
Interestingly, our framework also allows us to weigh in on the debate on credit policy in the presence of rational
bubbles. In an economy where bubbles serve as collateral Martin and Ventura (2016) advocate a “lean against the
wind” (LAW) credit policy to stabilize business cycles. Galí (2014) and Galí and Gambetti (2015), however, point
out that such a policy in the presence of nominal rigidities will end up increasing volatility in the economy. We
have a slightly different take on this debate as we focus on the implications of credit policy on long term growth.
We contrast long term growth under LAW with that obtained under a constant credit policy. Specifically, under the
LAW policy credit, d/A, rises (falls) when R&D productivity is low (high). Formally, the LAW credit rule is given by
d Nt /At =−εν∆λt /λ¯
This policy would supply (withdraw) credit during ∆λt < 0 (> 0). It can be shown that this policy offsets the effect
of the R&D shock on the growth rate completely. On the other hand, the constant credit rule increases d/A at a
constant rate and is given by
d Nt /At =
ενσ/λ¯
2
Figure 6 illustrates that the constant credit policy leads to higher long term growth when compared to the LAW
policy.6 The intuition once again follows from our discussion in Section 3.3. As long as the economy is borrowing
constrained and the credit in the economy does not exceed the maximum permissible limit, a constant credit rule
by alleviating borrowing constraints will succeed in delivering a higher long term growth rate in the economy.
[Figure 6 about here.]
6For this exercise, we use the same set of parameters in Table 1.
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7 Conclusion
In this paper, we introduce borrowing constraints into a standard two sector Schumpeterian growth model and
examine the impact of bubbles on R&D expenditure and innovation. Bubbles in our model emerge when there
are permanent adverse shocks to productivity in the credit constrained intermediate good sector. Importantly, in
contrast to much of the existing literature, bubbles do not appear when there are adverse shocks to productivity
in the final good sector. In such a framework, we establish that bubbles drive innovation during periods of low
productivity by alleviating credit constraints. We also contribute to the secular stagnation debate by advocating
a supply side debt-financed credit policy. Our bubble-mimicking credit policy that subsidizes R&D expenditure
alleviates credit constraints, thereby “crowding in” investment. Finally, our results suggest that while a lean against
the wind credit policy might succeed in mitigating business cycles, it could potentially lower long term growth.
Our analysis on the impact of bubbles is largely normative. It would be interesting to empirically investigate
the role bubbles have played in fostering innovation, particularly during periods of low productivity. We leave this
extension for future research.
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Appendix
Proof of Corollary 6
Proof. The proof consists of three parts. We first establish that the steady state path of growth maximizing bubbles
is characterized by bubbles of size z + zN = ξ(1+ g B∗ ). Suppose otherwise. Then, a chain of new bubbles can be
additionally issued by Corollary 4. Given Corollary 5, adding ∆zN is growth enhancing and sustainable until the
total size of bubble reaches ξ(1+ g B∗ ). This is a contradiction.
To see that maximum size of the new bubble is given by zN
∗ = ξg B∗ , observe that growth maximization requires
z+ zN∗ = ξ(1+ g B∗ ) and z = ξ by Corollary 4. Thus, zN∗ = ξ(1+ g B∗ )−ξ= ξg B∗ .
To solve for g B
∗
, once again, consider zNt = δεν, where new bubble per innovator is a fraction δ of the bubble-
less constrained investment. Thus, the maximum bubbly growth rate can be determined by noticing zN∗ = ξg B∗ =
δ∗ε(qpi)2λγ, where g B
∗ = gˆ (1+δ∗)0.5. This system of equations is straightforward to solve.
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Figure 1: Sequence of Events
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policy (the baseline), the red broken line indicates the bubble financed economy and the green dotted line is the
economy under the government debt policy. All series are detrended by the sample growth rate under the
baseline economy.
Figure 5: Comparison of bubbles and government debt policy
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Figure 6: Constant credit supply vs lean against the wind policy
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Parameter Value Remark
q 0.5 Loan-to-value ratio
α 0.3 Capital share
² 0.050 Measure of innovators a
γ 5 Target productivity
λ¯, σ 0.5,0.05 Steady state R&D efficiency and the size of shock
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a According to Global Entrepreneur Monitor (2016), 13% of US population runs own business and 37% of them engage
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